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Relations Exception to Federal
Jurisdiction Should Be Overruled
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In this paper, we consider two questions. First, we address whether there was proper standing for the Article III
courts to decide United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). We conclude that the third-party appellants lacked standing in federal court. Second, we examine whether cases challenging state same-sex marriage bans
were and are cases in “law and equity” or instead, barred
under the domestic relations exception for the purposes of
federal question jurisdiction. We conclude that the domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction is an archaic, historical remnant that should be overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court, and thus, the Article III federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear pure marital status cases despite their
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domestic nature. We call on the Supreme Court to eliminate
the domestic relations exception as to all forms of federal
jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Before the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court took action to legalize same-sex marriage. The Court struck
down the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in United
States v. Windsor,2 and then, in Hollingsworth v. Perry,3 the Supreme Court allowed a lower court ruling to go into effect that
deemed same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional. However, the
holdings in Windsor and Hollingsworth reveal a tension in the
Court’s interpretation of standing. In both cases, a third party attempted to appeal a lower court ruling, but only in Windsor was the
third party found to have met the standing requirement.4
In Hollingsworth, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion held
that several proponents of a California proposition lacked standing
to appeal the lower court order, given that the Attorney General and
Governor of California agreed that the proposition in question was
unconstitutional.5 Similarly, in Windsor, President Obama agreed
with the Second Circuit ruling below that the federal government
had acted unconstitutionally in defining marriage exclusively as the
union of one man and one woman;6 however, unlike the ruling in
Hollingsworth, the Court found standing for the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the U.S. House of Representatives to
1

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“DOMA instructs all federal officials, and
indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, . . . that [same-sex] marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for
no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity.”).
3
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (“Because petitioners have not satisfied their
burden to demonstrate standing to appeal the judgment of the District Court, the
Ninth Circuit was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The judgment of the
Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”).
4
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–89; Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667–68.
5
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660, 2667–68.
6
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
2
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defend DOMA.7 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissented here, on the grounds that, first, the President had
no standing to appeal a Second Circuit ruling with which he agreed,
and second, that BLAG lacked standing to appeal as a third party to
the case.8
As a matter of standing, we agree with Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion in Hollingsworth and Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Windsor. Private busybodies lack standing in federal court to defend
statutes denied defenses by federal or state executive officials.
Nonetheless, we disagree with the four conservative Justices on the
U.S. Supreme Court on the merits of the same-sex marriage issue
and agree with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s decision in Windsor
and Obergefell that DOMA and state bans on same-sex marriage are
unconstitutional.
There remains the issue of the domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction. The federal jurisdictional problems with cases
challenging the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans are
much more complex than is even recognized in the conservative Justices’ opinions in Windsor and Hollingsworth. There is a serious
question under current case law as to whether the federal courts have
either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction to decide
any pure same-sex marriage cases.9 This dilemma stems from the
longstanding domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction
that goes back to the founding of the Republic; pure marriage-law
cases cannot be heard in federal court.10 We conclude that the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction ought to be read as
not applying to marital-status cases. Instead, we would confine the
exception to purely religious matters, such as excommunication.
7

See id. at 2684–85, 2689.
See id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9
See, e.g., Chevalier v. Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 804 (6th Cir. 2015) (determining that the domestic relations exception did not bar the Appellant from commencing an action in diversity against her female partner).
10
See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697–701, 703 (1992); In
re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States.”). See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV 1787, 1822 (1995) (“The domestic relations exception reflected the view that family law constituted a distinctly communitarian endeavor, a subject reflecting locally shared values and norms.”).
8
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A. Pure Marriage Laws and the Question of “Cases in Law or
Equity”
The U.S. Constitution and the federal statutes on diversity and
federal question jurisdiction all employ the terminology “cases in
law or equity” in their grants of federal jurisdiction to the Article III
courts. Accordingly, the federal courts are restricted to hearing cases
that fall under that category. The scope of the domestic relations exception becomes relevant when trying to assess whether cases revolving purely around questions of marital status can be considered
as “cases in law or equity,” and can thereby be heard in federal court.
When state laws criminalized same-sex marriage, there was no federal jurisdiction issue because criminal cases were law-or-equity
suits. However, cases challenging the federal constitutionality of
state laws that only define the status of marriage are not so definitively determined, leaving room for debate as to whether such cases
were appropriately be heard in federal court.
In England during 1787, “Cases in Law and Equity” was a legal
term of art that encompassed only those cases that were brought before the Courts of Law (the Court of King’s Bench or the Court of
Common Pleas) and the Courts of Equity (the Court of Exchequer
or the Court of Chancery).11 At the time, matrimonial causes were
only heard in the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England,
and it was not until the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act of
1857 that the ordinary English courts were empowered to hear matrimonial and divorce cases.12 This was partly because, prior to 1857,
marriage in England was considered to be a strictly religious sacrament and not a contract.13 Marriage was similarly viewed in the
United States when Article III was enacted.14
By 1868, however, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, the idea of marriage had evolved. Marriage was thought of
as both a sacrament and a contract, as Andrea Matthews and Steven
11

For a general discussion regarding the Courts of Law and the Courts of
Equity, see generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 97–116 (4th ed. 2002).
12
See Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage Law from 1750:
A Bibliographic Essay, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 12, 16–17 (2001).
13
See id. at 4.
14
See Dailey, supra note 10, at 1821 (“From the earliest days of the Republic . . . , family law has unquestionably belonged to the states.”).
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Calabresi argue in their article, “Originalism and Loving v. Virginia,” and Article III had been the “Supreme Law of the Land” for
seventy-nine years.15 Under Article III, matrimonial causes were not
“cases in law and equity,” and, although the Fourteenth Amendment
created new rights, it did not add to the Article III jurisdiction of the
federal courts, which mandated that pure matrimonial causes (or domestic relations cases, as called by modern-day courts) be adjudicated exclusively in state courts.16 Consequently, many contend that
a Fourteenth Amendment argument against same-sex marriage bans
can only be addressed by state courts, each state determining for itself how the Fourteenth Amendment is to be understood within its
own borders.17 Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court would not
have had jurisdiction to overturn state bans on same-sex marriage in
Obergefell in June of 2015.
We conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court ought to overrule the
so-called domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. We
make this argument while noting that under American federalism,
the law of marriage and divorce is in “pith and substance” a question
of state law and not one of federal law.18 In our opinion, DOMA was
unconstitutional because Congress did not have the enumerated
15

See generally Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 15, at 1413–24.
See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 150–52, 165–66 (2009). See generally, U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”).
17
See generally Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 852–53 (2014) (“[I]t was nearly
impossible for gay rights advocates to persuade courts that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. . . . After Bowers, courts consistently rejected homosexual equality claims on the ground that
‘[i]t would be quite anomalous . . . to declare status defined by conduct that states
may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause.’”).
18
Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, 3 S.C.R. 837 (2011) (discussing
the pith and substance test in Canadian federalism cases). The Canadian Supreme
Court and, prior to 1949, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sitting in
London, England, have long decided Canadian federalism cases by asking
whether a statute is “in pith and substance” a matter of Canadian federal law or a
matter of Canadian provincial law. Id. We think this doctrine is a very useful one,
and we would urge the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the “pith and substance” test
in U.S. federalism cases.
16

714

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:708

power to adopt a federal marriage statute. It thus may seem to follow
that the very same Constitution, which leaves the definition of marriage to the states, would also prohibit the Article III federal courts
from hearing matrimonial causes or domestic relations cases. However, we reject that argument and demonstrate that an originalist understanding of the word “equity” supports the exercise of judicial
power to extend federal jurisdiction over domestic relations.
B. Our Framework
In this article, we argue that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Scalia were right on the federal jurisdictional issues in Windsor and
Hollingsworth. In Part I, we maintain that, first, litigants cannot appeal decisions with which they agree, and second, that private busybodies in the House of Representatives lack standing to appeal a
ruling legalizing same-sex marriage under federal law. In Part II, we
expand on that argument and explain why third parties lack standing
to defend the constitutionality of state-adopted initiatives when the
executive branch of the state governments so decline.
Finally, in Part III, we discuss the much broader federal jurisdictional problems with lawsuits like Windsor and Hollingsworth alluded to in this introduction. The case in Hollingsworth, in particular, could be argued to be absolutely not one in law or equity that
could be heard by Article III federal courts. Nevertheless, after considering this argument at some length, we reject this idea and conclude that Article III’s grant of equity jurisdiction has inherent evolutive meaning, and hence may expand to cover deficiencies in the
law. In today’s world, the federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases in
equity arising under federal law is best understood as encompassing
marital-status lawsuits, like the various same-sex marriage cases decided on the merits by federal courts of appeals. Thus, we close this
article by calling on the U.S. Supreme Court to eliminate the lingering features of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
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THE THIRD-PARTY APPELLANTS IN WINDSOR LACKED
STANDING IN FEDERAL COURT

A. Windsor Facts and DOMA
In United States v. Windsor,19 the Obama Administration sought
to appeal a Second Circuit holding with which it agreed to the effect
that DOMA was unconstitutional.20 The Administration argued that
since it was continuing to enforce DOMA21 and had been ordered to
pay Windsor a tax refund, it suffered sufficient legal injury to permit
an appeal of the Second Circuit’s legal ruling, despite agreeing with
the holding on the merits.22 To understand the Administration’s
claim, it is necessary to describe the background and procedural posture of the Windsor case.
DOMA was adopted in 1996.23 Section 3 of the Act amended
the Dictionary Act to provide for a federal definition of the words
“marriage” and “spouse” wherever they appeared in the U.S.
Code.24 Under DOMA, the word “marriage” in federal law was defined to mean “only a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife . . . .”25 Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were
both women, and they married in Canada in 2007.26 They lived together in New York State, where same-sex marriage was legal, and
the state accepted the legality of their Canadian marriage.27
Spyer died in February 2009, and she left her estate to Wind28
sor. Because of DOMA, “Windsor did not qualify for the marital

19

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See id. at 2684.
21
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419, by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (amending 1 U.S.C. § 7
and 28 U.S.C. § 1783C); see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), amended by DOMA, 110 Stat.
at 2419–20, and invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013);
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012), amended by DOMA, 110 Stat. at 2419, and invalidated
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
22
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–86.
23
See DOMA, 110 Stat. at 2419.
24
See DOMA § 3 (amending 1 U.S.C. § 7).
25
Id.
26
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
27
Id.
28
Id.
20
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exemption from the federal estate tax,” so she paid $363,053 in federal inheritance taxes and sought a subsequent refund from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).29 The IRS denied her request, also
because of DOMA.30 Windsor then sued the United States in the
Southern District of New York, contending that DOMA was unconstitutional.31 The Obama Administration “notified the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 530D, that the
Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality
of DOMA’s § 3”; however, the President did direct his administration to continue DOMA’s enforcement.32 The stated rationale for
this order was to facilitate judicial review of DOMA’s constitutionality.33 Consequently, BLAG voted to intervene in this case in order
to defend the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA.34 The district court
allowed BLAG to intervene as an interested party.35
B. Windsor’s Federal Standing: An Exception to the General
Taxpayer Rule
In the 1920’s the United States Supreme Court established the
general rule that taxpayers do not have standing in federal court to
challenge the constitutionality of a tax or expenditure of government
funds.36 The Court’s decision rejects taxpayer standing where there
is no particularized, individual legal injury.37 This case reaffirms
that the federal courts do not sit to correct generalized grievances
and that not all deprivations of constitutional rights can be litigated
in federal court. Though the federal courts have the power to protect
rights that were recognized at common law or in the English Courts
of Exchequer or Chancery, they are not ombudsmen with a general
charter to police and enforce the Constitution.38
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2683–84; see also 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a) (2012).
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
Id.
Id.
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

See id. at 480.
On several occasions, federal courts of various levels have made clear that
their role in the American system of governance is of a limited nature. See, e.g.,
38
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The Constitution presumes that generalized grievances suffered
equally by all taxpayers will be remedied by the political branches
of the government.39 A court ruling in favor of a single taxpayer like
Frothingham, who had challenged the constitutionality of a federal
spending program, would be considered an advisory opinion, which
is a judgment that does not enforce specific change, but rather advises on the constitutionality or interpretation of a law.40 Under Article III, the courts are not empowered to issue advisory opinions,
and a judicial decision in Frothingham’s favor would have been
purely speculative as to whether the ruling would have resulted in
any actual change in Frothingham’s federal tax bill.
The Court’s lack of power to issue advisory opinions is long established and rooted in early American history. In an episode known
as the Correspondence of the Justices,41 the U.S. Supreme Court was
asked to give Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson legal advice about
various abstract matters pertaining to U.S. foreign relations.42 The
Supreme Court politely declined Jefferson’s invitation, saying that
it lacked the power to adjudicate an issue unless there was a real,

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982) (“The federal courts were simply not constituted
as ombudsmen of the general welfare.”); ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook,
375 F.3d 484, 499 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically rejected
the idea that the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate claims brought
by . . . the ‘self-appointed Establishment Clause police’ . . . .”); Mazaleski v.
Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Our legitimate role in a case such
as this is necessarily a limited one. We must apply the Constitution, while carefully avoiding the temptation to act as ombudsmen . . . .”).
39
See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482 (“But what burden is imposed upon the states,
unequally or otherwise? Certainly there is none, unless it be the burden of taxation, and that falls upon their inhabitants, who are within the taxing power of Congress as well as that of the states where they reside.”).
40
See id. at 485 (Thompson, J., concurring) (“[T]his court is as much without
authority to pass abstract opinions upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress
as it [is] . . . of state statutes.”).
41
MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 501–03 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing and reproducing the Correspondence of
the Justices).
42
Id.
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concrete controversy among legally adverse parties.43 In another episode from the 1790s, known as Hayburn’s Case,44 most of the U.S.
Supreme Court Justices held that they lacked power under Article
III to review judicially determined veterans’ pensions when the
amounts in question could be raised or lowered by an executive
branch official following the judicial review.45 In other words, Justices could only hear cases for which a judicial ruling would be significantly likely to affect the concrete resolution for the involved
parties.46
It follows that the federal courts are empowered to hear only real
and concrete disagreements between adverse litigants when there is
a substantial likelihood that the judicial resolution of such disputes
would impact the litigants.47 The injury suffered by Frothingham
was not an injury that could be redressed by federal judicial action,
nor was the injury in Massachusetts v. Mellon.48 Thus, States, like
individual citizens, have no legal right under the Constitution to sue

43

Id.
2 U.S. 409 (1792); see also PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 496–501
(discussing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409).
45
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 409, 413–14 n.4.
46
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court made an
exception to its rule against taxpayer standing in cases where a violation of the
Establishment Clause was alleged. Many thought at the time that this was the
opening salvo in an effort by the Warren Court to abolish standing doctrine across
the board. The replacement of the Warren Court by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts left the traditional ban against taxpayer standing in place while allowing a
Flast v. Cohen exception for Establishment Clause cases only. The Roberts Court
appears to be close to overruling Flast v. Cohen, the reach of which it has greatly
circumscribed. See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131
S.Ct. 1436 (2011).
44

47
See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (“[T]he emphasis in
standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has
‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ and whether the dispute
touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’” (first
quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); and then quoting Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937))).
48
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–80 (1923) (holding that
the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Maternity Act when no rights of the state were brought within the actual or threatened
operation of the statute).
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in federal court for the purpose of challenging the general constitutionality of federal spending programs.
The distinction between Frothingham and Windsor is that Windsor did suffer a particularized, individual legal injury on account of
§ 3 of DOMA.49 Unlike similarly situated married, heterosexual
spouses, Windsor had to pay $363,053 in federal inheritance taxes
as a result of DOMA’s exclusive definition of “marriage.”50 Windsor’s injury was, therefore, not generally suffered by all taxpayers,
and her payment of the tax could be resolved by actual remedy
through a court order in her favor. For this reason, Windsor was an
exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing, and she did
have standing to challenge § 3 of DOMA in the district court.
C. The Obama Administration’s Lack of Federal Standing
The district court ruled in Windsor’s favor and held that § 3 of
DOMA was unconstitutional.51 The Obama Administration agreed,
but appealed to the Second Circuit, apparently hoping to lose in a
larger jurisdiction.52 The Second Circuit agreed that § 3 of DOMA
was unconstitutional and affirmed, and the Obama Administration
appealed again,53 this time to the U.S. Supreme Court, hoping to finally lose nationwide. The actions of the Obama Administration
raise the question of whether a litigant can appeal a court judgment
that he or she finds to be legally correct on the basis that complying
with the judicial ruling would impose financial costs on the litigant.
As exhibited by the Correspondence of the Justices, the federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear only certain categories of “cases”
and “controversies,”54 which involve legally adverse parties at all
stages of litigation, including on appeal.55 In Windsor, the United
States did not comply with the Court’s order that it pay Windsor a
tax refund, though it agreed that Windsor was legally entitled to the
49

See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–85 (2013).
Id. at 2683–84.
51
See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
52
See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
53
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–86.
54
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
55
See PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 501–03.
50
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refund.56 The majority in Windsor held that this was sufficient to
give the United States standing to appeal the district court’s and Second Circuit’s orders.57 As Justice Kennedy said:
The judgment in question orders the United States to
pay Windsor the refund she seeks. An order directing
the Treasury to pay money is ‘a real and immediate
economic injury,’ indeed as real and immediate as an
order directing an individual to pay a tax. That the
Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund
if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it
wants does not eliminate the injury to the national
Treasury if payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it
is not. The judgment orders the United States to pay
money that it would not disburse but for the court’s
order. . . . Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the
United States refuses to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.58
The majority argued that the financial cost of the refund sufficed
as an injury incurred by the United States, satisfying the prerequisite
of “controversy”;59 however, this argument is flawed because the
United States did not take the position that it was legally injured by
the district court’s or Second Circuit’s orders to refund Windsor.
Though there did exist a controversy between the United States and
Windsor because the Obama Administration refused to follow the
law as ordered by the courts, there was no controversy between the
parties over what the law entailed. Both parties agreed that the
United States was legally obligated to pay Windsor $363,053, and
there is no federal judicial power to review the correctness of a district court’s decision unless the United States explicitly asks the
court to do so. Here, the United States did not make such a request
of the Court.
The United States’ failure to follow through with obeying the
district court’s judgments may have created enough adverseness to
support appellate jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directing
56
57
58
59

See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–86.
Id. at 2688–89.
Id. at 2686 (citation omitted).
See id. at 2685–86.
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the government to pay Windsor. That Windsor was injured by the
United States’ failure to pay means that there was federal judicial
power to enforce the district court’s judgment.60 Nonetheless, it does
not follow that such a failure would have also created jurisdiction
for the Court to revisit the question of whether the United States’
denial of the refund was constitutional. Accordingly, there was no
case or controversy here. Windsor was a feigned case by the Obama
Administration seeking an advisory opinion, just like the Correspondence of the Justices and Hayburn’s Case.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the majority erred
because it assumed it is the province and duty of the judiciary to
always declare the law,61 as asserted in Marbury v. Madison.62 However, the statement in Marbury was made in the context of the U.S.
Supreme Court having to decide a bona fide case or controversy that
was already properly before the Court.63 In the setting of such a bona
fide case or controversy, it is indeed the province and duty of the
judiciary to determine the law. Nevertheless, the issue in Windsor
was whether such a bona fide case or controversy even existed, so
the Marbury dicta could not apply.
The majority also assumed that the federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate any question of United States constitutional meaning, and, as Justice Scalia argued, this concept, too, is mistaken.64
As is made clear in Frothingham and Mellon, there are many questions of constitutional meaning that are not justiciable by the federal
courts and that, therefore, must be left to the political branches of
government.65 American-style judicial review does not empower the
60

See id.
See id. at 2697–2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have no power to decide
this case.”).
62
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”).
63
See id. at 147–49.
64
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697–2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600
(2007) (Alito, J.) (“Because the interests of the taxpayer are, in essence, the interests of the public at large, deciding a constitutional claim based solely on taxpayer
standing ‘would be[,] not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position
of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an
authority which plainly we do not possess.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923))); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wild61
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United States Supreme Court to enforce or interpret the Constitution
in the way that constitutional courts are so empowered in Germany
or in other foreign nations.66 There is no judicial review clause or
constitutional interpretation clause in the U.S. Constitution, and Article III empowers the federal courts to decide only “cases” or “controversies” using the “judicial” power.67 Windsor did not present a
case or controversy about § 3 of DOMA because the United States
agreed with the judgments delivered by the courts below, and there
is no standing for a party to appeal a court judgment with which it
agrees, seeking to lose again on appeal in a grander arena.
D. BLAG’s Lack of Federal Standing
1. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR
LEGISLATIVE STANDING
Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the Obama Administration lacked standing to appeal Windsor, but he took the position
that BLAG had standing to appeal the Second Circuit’s judgment
because a majority of the House of Representatives approved the
appeal.68 Justice Alito asserted that each House of Congress has a
life, 504 U.S. 555, 559–66, 576 (1992) (denying standing to environmental protection groups challenging a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior for failure
to sufficiently assert personal injury, and noting that “[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution
and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive” (emphasis in original)); Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) (“[T]he courts have no
power to consider in isolation and annul an act of Congress on the ground that it
is unconstitutional; but may consider that question ‘only when the justification for
some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made
to rest upon such an act.’”).
66
See Ronald L. Watts, The Political Use or Abuse of Courts in Federal Systems, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509, 514–19 (1998).
67
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
68
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). In this view, the
case involved three parties, two of which are the United States: the House of Representatives v. Windsor and he Executive Branch. While the President found
DOMA unconstitutional, the House of Representatives disagreed and fought for
DOMA’s defense. However, the power to defend federal legislation in court lies
outside the power of Congress for good reason. A power for Congress to defend
its own laws would upset the balance of powers laid out by the Constitution. The
principle of the separation of powers is essential to our country’s foundation, as
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judicially cognizable interest in defending the constitutionality of
federal laws in federal court when the President finds the laws unconstitutional and declines their enforcement.69 In this way, Justice
Alito seemingly shares in Justice Kennedy’s presumption that federal courts have the same power enjoyed by constitutional courts in
other countries to interpret and enforce the Constitution in all contexts, and this view is deeply mistaken.
The United States federal courts were not set up to be constitutional ombudsmen, or public advocates charged with investigating
and addressing complaints of maladministration. There is no clause
in Article III that can be plausibly read to be so empowering, as Article III grants to federal courts the power to hear six enumerated
categories of controversies, including controversies to which the
United States is a party and controversies among two or more states.
The six controversies stipulated in Article III, Section 2 are as follows:
The Judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a
State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens
of different States,—between Citizens of the same
State claiming Land under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.70
Conspicuously missing from this list are controversies between
either House of Congress and the President as to whether a law is
constitutional. By enumerating the categories of cases that federal
courts have the power to hear, Article III deliberately withholds jurisdiction over other types of controversies, including controversies

Madison said in Federalist No. 47: “No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 271 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed.,
2009).
69
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
70
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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arising when the Executive declines to defend the constitutionality
of a federal law.71
Many foreign constitutions provide for the standing of individual legislators or a certain number of legislators to challenge the
constitutionality of a law or an executive-branch action, but the U.S.
Constitution does not so provide. Consider, for example, Article 93
of the German Basic Law, which sets out the jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court. Article 93 explicitly states:
The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule:
....
2. in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning
the formal or substantive compatibility of federal law
or Land law with this Basic Law, or the compatibility
of Land law with other federal law, on application of
the Federal Government, of a Land government, or
of one fourth of the Members of the Bundestag;
....
3. in the event of disagreements concerning the rights
and duties of the Federation and the Länder, especially in the execution of federal law by the Länder
and in the exercise of federal oversight;
4. on other disputes involving public law between the
Federation and the Länder, between different Länder, or within a Land, unless there is recourse to another court;
4a. on constitutional complaints, which may be filed
by any person alleging that one of his basic rights or
one of his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or
under Article 33, 38, 101, 103 or 104 has been infringed by public authority . . . .72

71

See Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (“The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”).
72
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Article 93, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
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The German Basic Law differs from Article III of the U.S. Constitution by explicitly empowering one fourth of the members of the
Bundestag, the lower House of the German parliament, to sue in the
Constitutional Court when a question arises regarding the constitutionality of a federal law.
Similarly, under French law, sixty members of either the Senate
or the National Assembly have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a proposed law before the French Constitutional Council. Article 61 of the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic explicitly provides that: “Acts of Parliament may be referred to the
Constitutional Council, before their promulgation, by the President
of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National
Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators.”73
The French and German constitutions are thus quite clear in
providing legislators with standing to raise constitutional challenges
before their respective constitutional courts. However, there is no
analogous clause in Article III of the U.S. Constitution granting federal courts this power.
Precedent also demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court does
not generally review cases like those suggested by Justice Alito. In
Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of Congress
lacked standing to bring constitutional challenges,74 and in his concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter, Justice Powell stated that a suit
brought by a single member of the Senate was not even ripe because
there was no controversy between the President and the Senate until
the latter, by majority action, brought suit.75 If the Executive fails to
fulfill his duties, the Constitution does provide for appropriate Congressional responses. Congress can act by impeaching the President,
holding oversight hearings, and cutting off appropriations.
However, 226 years of almost unbroken constitutional practice
suggests the intended application of Article III’s plain text.76 The
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear “controversies” between Congress and the Executive, nor does Congress have power
73
74
75
76

1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.).
521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
444 U.S. 996, 997–98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
See generally Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792).
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to sue the President over his exercise of law-enforcement discretion.
As legislative standing to sue is absent from Article III’s enumerated
categories, federal courts do not have the jurisdiction to hear the
kind of cases that Justice Alito suggested regarding BLAG. For this
reason, Justice Alito’s concurrence is flatly contradicted by the plain
text of Article III; an issue he fails to address in his opinion.77
It becomes even more difficult to understand Justice Alito’s
opinion regarding BLAG’s standing in the context of his rejection
of Massachusetts’s standing in Massachusetts v. Mellon and Massachusetts v. EPA.78 In Mellon, the Supreme Court considered a claim
of federal jurisdiction between Massachusetts and the federal government, when Massachusetts claimed that Congress was spending
money unconstitutionally.79 The states, like the House of Representatives, are institutional, governing bodies, which, under German
constitutional law, have standing to raise constitutional claims.80
However, the Supreme Court in Mellon held that the states have no
standing under the U.S. Constitution to bring suit.81 Justice Alito
agreed with this holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, when he joined
the dissents authored by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia,
both of which argued against state standing.82 The claim for Massachusetts State standing is arguably analogous to BLAG’s claim for
standing to appeal, yet Justice Alito found standing for BLAG. This
inconsistency makes Justice Alito’s opinion in Windsor unclear.
2. CASES BETWEEN POLITICAL BRANCHES ARE NOT “LAW OR
EQUITY” SUITS
Since, hypothetically, a suit by Congress against the President
would revolve around federal law, it is likely that Justice Alito found
standing for BLAG and the House of Representatives because he
thought the case to be one “in law and equity.” However, Article III
77
For more debate on whether a single house of Congress has standing to
bring a federal case, see Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited)
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014).
78
See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
79
See 262 U.S. 447, 478–79 (1923).
80
See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Article 93.
81
See 262 U.S. at 480–89.
82
See 549 U.S. at 535–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 549–560 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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unequivocally states that “[c]ases affecting [a]mbassadors, other
public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls . . .” and “[c]ases of admiralty and
maritime [j]urisdiction . . .” are not “cases in law and equity,” even
though they may arise under federal law.83
The historical reasoning for this jurisdictional distinction is
rooted in the British court system. In our opinion, based on Professor
Calabresi’s knowledge of English legal history in 1787, admiralty
cases in Great Britain were heard by special admiralty courts without jury trials; “cases in law” were heard by the Court of King’s
Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer;
and “cases in equity” were heard by the Court of Chancery and the
Court of Exchequer.84 Neither the Law Courts nor the Court of
Chancery had jurisdiction to hear lawsuits brought by a House of
Parliament against the King for the King’s failure to faithfully execute Parliament’s acts.85 It thus makes sense that, in his opinion, Justice Alito did not point to an instance from 1789 to the present day
in which the federal courts heard a case like the controversy he suggested between BLAG and Windsor. Such a case could never have
been heard, either in England or in the United States.
There is one prior United States Supreme Court precedent, INS
v. Chadha, in which the House of Representatives did have standing
to challenge an executive branch failure to execute a law.86 In
Chadha, the INS gave Jagdish Rai Chadha a stay of an order of deportation, and the House of Representatives purported to veto the
83

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER, & BRUCE P.
SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009).
85
In fact, neither the Law Courts nor the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction
to hear cases of impeachment. The House of Commons had the sole power to
initiate impeachments, and the House of Lords had the sole power to try them.
The Law Courts and the Courts of Chancery and Exchequer could not review such
cases, which helps explain why the U.S. Supreme Court was right in United States
v. Nixon to rule that impeachment cases in the United States raise a political question, which the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to resolve, even though they
arise under federal law. See generally 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Thus, Article III of
the Constitution does not give federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases of impeachment that arise under federal law, and Article I gives the “sole” power to initiate
such cases to the House of Representatives and the “sole” power to try them to
the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
86
462 U.S. 919, 935–36 (1983).
84
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stay of deportation pursuant to a statute that provided for a onechamber legislative veto.87 The Court found that it had jurisdiction
to hear this case and held on the merits that all legislative vetoes are
unconstitutional.88
The Chadha case is easily distinguishable from Windsor. In
Chadha, each chamber of Congress had a statutory right to veto executive branch actions, and the executive branch disagreed, arguing
that legislative vetoes were unconstitutional.89 Each chamber of
Congress thus suffered a legal injury in Chadha through the deprivation of a legal right explicitly conferred upon Congress by federal
statutory law.90 In contrast, the two chambers of Congress in Windsor did not have a statutory legal right to sue in federal court when
the President declined to execute a law that he thought was unconstitutional. The House of Representatives can impeach a President
who it thinks is not faithfully executing the law, but it cannot sue
him seeking an injunction from a court anymore than the State of
Massachusetts can sue the federal government over an unconstitutional spending bill or over the EPA’s exercise of its law-enforcement discretion.
3. THE PRESIDENTIAL DUTY
Article II, Section III, of the U.S. Constitution obligates the President to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed . . . .”91
Then, Article VI says that “[t]his Constitution, and the [l]aws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance [t]hereof . . . shall
be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every [s]tate
shall be bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of
any State to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding.”92
Thus, the term “laws” in Article II encompasses the federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution, and the President has both the right

87
88
89
90
91
92

See id. at 923–28.
See id. at 929–44.
See id. at 925, 957–58.
See id. at 951–59.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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and the duty to enforce the Constitution in accordance with his interpretation.93 Therefore, President Obama fulfilled his duty by finding § 3 of DOMA unconstitutional in Windsor, and he stayed faithful
to his understanding of the Constitution by refusing to defend
DOMA in court.94
The President is an independent interpreter of the Constitution
and must read the Constitution without regard to the contrary views
of Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court. As President Andrew Jackson said in vetoing the Bank of the United States on constitutional
grounds in 1832, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland95:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must
each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the
Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath
to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood
by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or
approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may
be brought before them for judicial decision. The
opinion of the judges has no more authority over
Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the

93

See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (“In the
performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government
must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by
any branch is due great respect from the others.” (emphasis added)); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988) (discussing the President’s obligation
to comply with the courts’ judgments but not with the courts’ interpretation of the
law, evidenced by precedent); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1219 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“[E]xecutive officials necessarily interpret the laws they enforce . . . .”).
94
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–85 (2013).
95
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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judges, and on that point the President is independent
of both.96
Hence, the enumerated power in Article II, Section III, imposes
a duty on the President to execute laws that he or she believes to be
constitutional, not laws that Congress believes to be constitutional.
4. WHY COLEMAN V. MILLER IS UNRELIABLE
Justice Alito relied on one final case to support his argument that
BLAG had standing to appeal in Windsor: Coleman v. Miller, which
was decided in 1939.97 In Coleman, Chief Justice Hughes, writing
for himself, Justice Stone, and Justice Reed, concluded that a majority of the Kansas State Senate had standing in federal court to litigate
the constitutionality of Kansas’s ratification of an amendment to the
federal constitution.98 The two dissenters, Justice Butler joined by
Justice McReynolds, also agreed that there was standing.99 However, Justices Frankfurter, Black, Roberts, and Douglas wrote separately in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter asserting that the Kansas
State senators did not have standing to sue in this case.100 These
same four Justices also joined an opinion by Justice Black saying
that this case raised a non-justiciable political question.101
To be blunt, a 5–4 standing holding from 1939 that was dependent on the votes of four pre-New Deal Supreme Court Justices is a
dubious source of legal authority at best, especially in the face of the
contrary opinion by Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, Black, and Douglas. The standing holding of Coleman is not well-reasoned and has
barely been followed.102 As a general matter, neither state nor federal majorities of legislative houses have brought lawsuits in the federal courts. Article III simply does not create federal jurisdiction
over these kinds of controversies.
96
PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 68 (quoting at length President Jackson’s
message vetoing the bill that would have renewed the Bank of the United States).
97
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
98
See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 456.
99
See id. at 470–74.
100
See id. at 460–70.
101
See id. at 457–60.
102
See generally Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The
Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (1999).
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5. CONCLUSION ON BLAG’S LACK OF STANDING
Given the text of Article III and the last 226 years of practice,
we think Justice Alito’s argument for BLAG’s standing is poorly
reasoned and unpersuasive. If followed, it would revolutionize our
form of government by inserting the federal courts into the middle
of political disputes between the President and the two houses of
Congress over how to best execute the laws. This is not a road the
U.S. Supreme Court ought to follow.
E. Prudential Standing Principles
The final argument for standing in Windsor is Justice Kennedy’s
claim that prudential standing principles suggest federal jurisdiction
be exercised here.103 This argument also fails. The prudential limits
on standing in the federal courts are judicially created doctrines—
which can be overridden by Congress—that generally bar thirdparty standing and the litigation of both generalized grievances that
are shared by all citizens and statutory matters that are not within
the zone of interest of a statute.104 Congress cannot override the core
Article III standing requirements, which are implicit in the case or
controversy requirement, and the federal courts have no power to
waive standing rules for prudential reasons merely because the Justices want to hear a particular case.
F. Considering “Legal Injury”
The Court has said that Article III allows a litigant to have standing to sue in federal court only when a party has suffered a “legal
injury” that is: 1) “concrete and particularized”; 2) “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; 3) “fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant”; and 4) likely to be prevented or
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.105 As discussed above,
Windsor suffered such a legal injury when she was denied a spousal
exemption from the inheritance tax.106 The United States, however,
did not suffer a legal injury when the district court agreed with the
103

See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685–86.
See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of
Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1243 n.4, 1266 (2011).
105
See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citation omitted).
106
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685–86.
104
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Obama Administration and ruled that § 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.
In our opinion, a party cannot be legally injured by a court ruling
that he or she supports, even if complying with that decision imposes
financial costs on the party. Similarly, a party cannot appeal from a
decision that he or she supports with the hopes of losing in a larger
jurisdiction.107 Consider, for example, the case of a taxpayer who
agrees with the federal government that he owes the IRS $35,000 in
income taxes. Such a taxpayer does not have standing to sue the
government, even though compliance with the tax code will cost
him $35,000. A taxpayer does not suffer a “legal injury” when he is
assessed for taxes that he agrees he owes, and there is an important
distinction between actions that may “harm” or “burden” an individual and actions that do cause “legal injury.”
The United States did not suffer a “legal injury” when the district
court ruled that the United States owed Windsor a $363,053 tax refund precisely because the Obama Administration agreed with the
Court’s determination. Absent a legal injury, the United States did
not have standing to appeal to the Second Circuit or to the United
States Supreme Court. The United States’ failure to pay Windsor
only meant that Windsor had standing to request the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, ordering that she finally be paid the refund.
II.

THE THIRD-PARTY APPELLANTS IN HOLLINGSWORTH
LACKED FEDERAL STANDING

A. Hollingsworth Procedural History
The lawsuit in Hollingsworth v. Perry108 originated after the California Supreme Court held, in 2008, that a California ban on samesex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California
107

See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333–34
(1980) (“Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district
court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom.” However, “[i]n an
appropriate case, appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the
judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits,
so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of
Art. III.”).
108
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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Constitution.109 In the wake of the ruling, a number of same-sex couples were legally married in California; however, later that year,
California voters passed Proposition 8, a statewide initiative that
amended the California State Constitution to again ban same-sex
marriage.110 In response to the ban, two same-sex couples, Kristin
Perry and Sandra Stier, and Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo,
brought this lawsuit in federal district court after being prohibited to
marry by California state officials.111
Though the California Governor and State Attorney General refused to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8 in court, the
district court permitted the official proponents of the initiative,
which included State Senator Dennis Hollingsworth, to do so as intervenors.112 Ultimately, the district court held Proposition 8 to be
unconstitutional, and the Governor and Attorney General of California declined to appeal.113 Nonetheless, Hollingsworth and a bevy of
private busybodies did purport114 to appeal to the Ninth Circuit to
defend the constitutionality of the proposition.115
The Ninth Circuit doubted whether Hollingsworth had standing
to appeal the district court ruling and, thus, certified the following
question to the California State Supreme Court:
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California
Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the
official proponents of an initiative measure possess
either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the State’s interest in
the initiative’s validity, which would enable them to
defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its

109
110

See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927–28 (N.D. Cal.

2010).
111

Id. at 927.
Id. at 928.
113
See id. at 1003.
114
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, the Justices raised doubts that
initiative proponents “have a quasi-legislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure they successfully sponsored.” 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
115
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
112
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adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that
duty refuse to do so.116
The California Supreme Court ruled that Hollingsworth did have
standing to appeal the district court’s order, and the Ninth Circuit
accepted that conclusion and ruled in favor of Perry’s same-sex marriage claim.117 Hollingsworth then appealed the Ninth Circuit ruling
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.118
B. Hollingsworth’s Lack of Standing
Reflecting on the Court’s definition of “legal injury” discussed
in Part II, it is quite clear that Hollingsworth, as a third party to the
litigation, did not suffer such a legal injury. This poses the question
of whether a third party may sue in federal court seeking enforcement of a federal statute, to which we answer no. In this Part, we
argue that the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in overruling the California Supreme Court’s finding of standing. Third parties are not
empowered to seek enforcement of federal law, and thus, Hollingsworth did not have standing to sue in federal court.
1. LAW ENFORCEMENT IS THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF THE
EXECUTIVE
The power to enforce criminal law is exclusive to the Executive
branch, as federal and state prosecutors are a part of their respective
executive branches.119 For example, it is an axiom of standing law
that crime victims do not have standing to request a judicial order
directing state or federal prosecutors to prosecute a particular individual.120 In the seminal case of United States v. Cox,121 the Fifth
Circuit held that a federal district judge could not jail the U.S. Attorney or Acting Attorney General of the United States, Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach, simply because the attorneys refused to bring a
116

Id.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2011).
118
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
119
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93 (1789).
120
Only a U.S. Attorney has standing to initiate a federal prosecution. United
States v. Cox, 342 F2d. 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
117

121

342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
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federal prosecution against two African American civil rights workers whom the district judge wanted to see prosecuted.122 The Fifth
Circuit held that the Executive branch had judicially unreviewable
discretion to refuse to bring criminal prosecution where it believed
such action would be unjust;123 this holding is also supported by Attorney General Roger B. Taney’s Opinion on the Jewels of the Princess of Orange.124 President Thomas Jefferson also supported this
decision when he ordered that the prosecution of William Duane for
violating the Sedition Act of 1798 be dropped on the grounds that
the statute was unconstitutional.125 President Jefferson defended his
decision by writing the following:
The President is to have the laws executed. He may
order an offense then to be prosecuted. If he sees a
prosecution put into a train which is not lawful, he
may order it to be discontinued and put into a legal
train. . . . There appears to be no weak part in any of
these positions or inferences.126
It follows that no third party has standing to challenge a presidential or Justice Department decision to forego a prosecution. Before federal death-row prisoner Gary Gilmore was executed by a firing squad in 1977, his mother was denied standing when she attempted to argue that the execution was cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment.127 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was
Gary Gilmore’s exclusive right to bring the claim, that Gilmore
waived that right by asking to be executed, and that his mother
lacked standing to raise the claim on his behalf.128 Only a federal
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See id. at 171–72.
See id.
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See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831), 1831 WL 995; see also PAULSEN ET AL.,
supra note 52, at 319–21.
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See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY
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LAW 116–22 (2010).
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PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 318.
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See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014–15 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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See id. at 1014–15 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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defendant who is prosecuted has standing to raise constitutional arguments in his or her defense; this rule also pertains to state criminal
prosecutions.129
Third parties also lack standing to sue for the enforcement of
other federal or state laws when the government denies their enforcement. This point is illustrated by the response to President
Obama’s recent executive action. On June 15, 2012, the President
ordered that the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) not be enforced against an estimated population of
between 800,000 and 1.4 million individuals who were illegally present in the United States.130 This unilateral exercise of presidential
prosecutorial discretion had the effect of writing into federal law the
so-called “DREAM Act,”131 a bill consistently blocked by Congress
since 2001. Notwithstanding the dramatic scope of the President’s
action, the deportation advocates do not have standing to challenge
the President’s action in federal court. Although private litigants
may be dismayed by presidential exercises of law enforcement discretion, such parties are not “legally injured” by the executive action
and, therefore, have no legal right to sue over the Executive’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
These same principles apply to State Senator Hollingsworth’s
attempt to appeal the district court’s holding that California’s Proposition 8 was unconstitutional when neither the Governor nor the
Attorney General of California agreed to enforce the law.132 Article
V, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides as follows: “The
supreme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor. The
Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed.”133 Article V,
Section 13 follows with the powers of the Attorney General of California:
Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the
Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the
129

See generally id. at 1014–17 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?_r=0.
131
See DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010).
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See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661–63 (2013).
133
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to
see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall have
direct supervision over every district attorney and
sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers
as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining
to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning
the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to
the Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever
in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the
State is not being adequately enforced in any county,
it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court
shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When required by the public interest or directed by the Governor, the Attorney General shall
assist any district attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.134
It is unquestionable whether the Governor and Attorney General
of California have the exclusive right to execute—or to direct the
execution of—all laws, criminal and civil, in the State of California.
Indeed, the Governor has the explicit power and duty to make sure
“that the law is faithfully executed,” and no third parties can legally
assume this role.
2. HOLLINGSWORTH DID NOT SUFFER A LEGAL INJURY
The “legal injury” claimed by Hollingsworth is not the sort of
traditional legal injury for which litigants in federal court have ever
been entitled to sue in American history. Hollingsworth alleged to
have suffered an injury when same-sex couples were granted marriage licenses in California in defiance of Proposition 8; however,
the federal courts do not generally allow people to sue when they

134

Id. § 13.
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are disgruntled by another’s matrimony.135 If our child or close
friend chooses to marry someone of whom we disapprove, we may
be very upset, but this discontent does not amount to “a legal injury”
over which we can sue in federal court. Not a single reported case
grants an individual standing to sue for having morally disapproved
of the marriage of another couple. A litigant would not be deemed
to have suffered a legal injury in this setting, unless there was bigamy or incest involved, and even then, a court proceeding would
almost certainly take place through a criminal trial in which the State
Attorney General and Governor would participate. Otherwise, a private suit challenging a specific couple’s marriage would be dismissed because the plaintiff had not suffered a legally cognizable
injury.
Hollingsworth might have claimed another injury—that their
state constitutional right to amend the state’s constitution through
the initiative process was denied when the Governor and Attorney
General of California refused to defend Proposition 8. This claim,
too, would fail. Article II, Section 8 of the California State Constitution sets out most of the provisions that govern a citizen’s right to
legislate by initiative.136 It provides as follows:
(a) The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution
and to adopt or reject them.
(b) An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition that sets
forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment
to the Constitution and is certified to have been
signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the
case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an
amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all

135

See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 (“For the reasons we have explained, petitioners have likewise not suffered an injury in fact, and therefore
would ordinarily have no standing to assert the State’s interests.”); id. at 2668
(“We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline
to do so for the first time here.”).
136
See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial
election.
(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general election held at least 131 days
after it qualifies or at any special statewide election
held prior to that general election. The Governor may
call a special statewide election for the measure.
(d) An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have
any effect.
(e) An initiative measure may not include or exclude
any political subdivision of the State from the application or effect of its provisions based upon approval
or disapproval of the initiative measure, or based
upon the casting of a specified percentage of votes in
favor of the measure, by the electors of that political
subdivision.
(f) An initiative measure may not contain alternative
or cumulative provisions wherein one or more of
those provisions would become law depending upon
the casting of a specified percentage of votes for or
against the measure.137
Nowhere does this section suggest that the proponents of an initiative in California have the legal right to defend its constitutionality in federal court when the Governor and Attorney General of
the State decline to do so.
Despite this, the California Supreme Court did hold in Perry v.
Brown138 that the proponents of Proposition 8 had standing “under
California law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure
when the public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so.”139 The Supreme Court of
137
138
139

Id.
265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011).
Id. at 1007.
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California based its decision on the California Elections Code and
Article II, Section 8, of the California Constitution.140 However, the
plain language of Article II, Section 8 in no way supports the California Supreme Court’s holding. The federal Constitution does not
provide for state initiatives and referenda, nor does it give the proponents of such measures standing to defend them in federal court.
To the extent that the Constitution does address the constitutional
questions that are raised by initiatives and referenda, it does so in
Article IV, Section 4, which states: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”141
In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,142 the
U.S. Supreme Court reached the dubious conclusion that the constitutionality of direct democracy via initiatives and referenda raised a
political question insofar as it was inconsistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of government.143 However,
the holding in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. did not
justify standing for Hollingsworth to file suit in federal court. The
right of California citizens to legislate through initiatives and referenda, as stipulated by the California Constitution, does not include
an express right of action for privately interested parties to defend
the constitutionality of such initiatives and referenda when the Governor and Attorney General so decline.144 The California Supreme
Court may be willing to engage in such free-style constitution rewriting, but there is no reason why the federal courts, being tribunals
of limited jurisdiction, should defer to the California Supreme Court
on this issue. Imagine for a moment what would likely proceed if
Hollingsworth were to prevail in the instant case. County clerk registrars would be advised by the Governor and State Attorney General to defy the holding, and the federal court ruling would exist in
140

See id. at 1006–07.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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223 U.S. 118 (1912).
143
See id. at 149–51. Although this question is now settled as accepted precedent, Steven Calabresi thinks this decision was arguably wrong as an initial matter and that Article IV, Section 4 originally forbade direct democracy in the states.
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vacuo. Whether the injury claimed by Hollingsworth could be redressed by judicial order was thus entirely speculative, and federal
jurisdiction is not permissible under these circumstances, as was recognized long ago in Hayburn’s Case.145
Nevertheless, the issue of whether a litigant has suffered an actual legal injury and merits standing in federal court is a question of
federal law. State court rulings as to property, contract, or tort law
may, in effect, expand the range of state legal injuries for which a
litigant can sue in federal court; however, while the standing inquiry
may be intertwined with state law, neither Congress nor the states
can create standing to satisfy the curiosity of uninjured third parties.146 In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,147 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, addressed the question of who has standing to sue
in federal court:
In limiting the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies,” Article III of the Constitution restricts it
to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts,
which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently
threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law. Except when necessary in the
execution of that function, courts have no charter to
review and revise legislative and executive action.
This limitation “is founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in
a democratic society.”
The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines
that reflect this fundamental limitation. It requires
federal courts to satisfy themselves that “the plaintiff
has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” He bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought.
To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that
he is under threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is
145
146
147

See generally Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792).
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662–63 (2013).
555 U.S. 488 (2009).
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concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual
and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it
must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable
judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.
This requirement assures that “there is a real need to
exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complaining party[.]” Where
that need does not exist, allowing courts to oversee
legislative or executive action “would significantly
alter the allocation of power . . . away from a democratic form of government[.]”148
Simply put, Hollingsworth did not face an actual or imminent
legal injury because of the way in which California administered its
marriage laws, and permitting the Court to adjudicate a lawsuit in
the absence of such injury would threaten the government’s balance
of powers by granting increased oversight to the judiciary. Thus,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan correctly decided Hollingsworth.149 Hollingsworth lacked
standing to appeal the judgment of the district court.
III.

THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED

A. The Origins of Federal Question Jurisdiction
The asserted basis for federal court jurisdiction in Obergefell,
Windsor and Hollingsworth is that the lawsuits were brought under
the first clause of Article III, Section 2, which, as we noted in the
Introduction, asserts the following: “The Judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority . . . .”150 In Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress provided the U.S. Supreme Court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from state supreme courts where the validity
148
149
150

Id. at 492–93 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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of a federal law or treaty was called into question by the state
courts.151 The lower federal courts were not, however, given this
broad grant of federal question jurisdiction by Congress until
1875—well after the Civil War.152 For more than eighty years, the
lower federal courts were almost exclusively confined to hearing diversity suits and admiralty cases.153
On March 3, 1875, Congress granted the lower federal courts
general federal question jurisdiction when it passed the Jurisdiction
and Removal Act, which stated, in relevant part, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That the circuit courts of the United
States shall have original cognizance, concurrent
with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity, where the
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . . . .154
The language of the grant of the federal question jurisdiction was
directly modeled on the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which explicitly provided for federal court diversity jurisdiction
over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . .”155
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,156 which is the leading case on the domestic relations exception to the federal courts diversity jurisdiction:
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that “the circuit
courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent
with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a
151

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (1789).
See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470
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civil nature at common law or in equity, where the
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a
party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State.” The defining phrase, “all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity,” remained a key element
of statutory provisions demarcating the terms of diversity jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress
amended the diversity jurisdiction provision to eliminate this phrase and replace in its stead the term “all
civil actions.”
....
. . . We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a
domestic relations exception exists as a matter of
statutory construction not on the accuracy of the historical justifications on which it was seemingly
based, but rather on Congress’ apparent acceptance
of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948, when the statute
limited jurisdiction to “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.” As the . . . [Second Circuit
has] observed, “More than a century has elapsed
since the Barber dictum without any intimation of
Congressional dissatisfaction. . . . Whatever Article
III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber
dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congressional grant.” Considerations of stare decisis have
particular strength in this context, where “the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains
free to alter what we have done.”
When Congress amended the diversity statute in
1948 to replace the law/equity distinction with the
phrase “all civil actions,” we presume Congress did
so with full cognizance of the Court’s nearly centurylong interpretation of the prior statutes, which had
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construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for certain domestic relations matters. With respect to the 1948 amendment, the Court
has previously stated that “no changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in
the revision unless an intent to make such changes is
clearly expressed.” With respect to such a longstanding and well-known construction of the diversity
statute, and where Congress made substantive
changes to the statute in other respects, we presume,
absent any indication that Congress intended to alter
this exception, that Congress “adopt[ed] that interpretation” when it reenacted the diversity statute.157
The Supreme Court thus concluded that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction under the diversity statute over the tort claim of child
abuse because, in 1787, that statute gave courts jurisdiction to hear
only “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,” which then
meant lawsuits that could be heard by the Court of King’s Bench,
the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court
of Chancery in Great Britain.158 As we noted earlier, suits regarding
marriage, divorce, alimony, child support, and probate were heard
by the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England.159 It was not
until Parliament passed the Matrimonial Causes Acts of 1857 to
1878 that an ordinary court—the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes—acquired jurisdiction over family law cases.160 In 1875, the
High Court was created to try all important English cases and was
given a Queens Bench Division, Chancery Division, and Family Division.161 The Family Division then acquired jurisdiction over all
matrimonial causes.162

157
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See id. at 693, 699–700; see also A. T. CARTER, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 177–84 (Butterworth & Co.) (1902).
160
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The important point for this article is that when the Judiciary Act
of 1789 was written, the phrase “suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity” was not understood to encompass matrimonial
causes because the English courts of law and equity did not have
jurisdiction over matrimonial causes until at least 1857. It is for this
reason that, in 1858, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly held in Barber v. Barber that there was a domestic relations exception to the
federal court’s diversity jurisdiction.163 Domestic relations cases
were understood as simply not “suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity” that could be brought before the Royal Courts of
Justice at the Strand in 1789.164 Indeed, Professor Meredith Johnson
Harbach notes that “[f]ew of what are regarded as the foundational
cases” of the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction “arose in the context of diversity jurisdiction.”165 Professor Harbach observes that, although Barber arose under the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction, four other important domestic relations cases
came about differently.166
In Ankenbrandt, Justice White spoke for the Court and made two
holdings regarding the jurisdictional grant. First, the 1948 reformulation of the diversity jurisdiction to replace the phrase “all suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity” with the phrase “all civil
actions” was not meant to change the meaning of the jurisdictional

163

Barber, 62 U.S. at 589–94.
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698–701 (1992) (discussing
Barber, 62 U.S. 582).
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diversity jurisdiction), with Ohio ex rel. Popvici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 382
(1930) (coming before Court on writ of certiorari from Ohio Supreme Court, although federal law was at issue), De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 308
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Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168–69 (1899) (arising under federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction over the territorial courts), Perrine v. Slack, 164 U.S. 452, 453
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grant. Second, the change in term thus did not eliminate the domestic relations exception to the diversity jurisdiction.167 Ankenbrandt
remains very much the governing case law of the present day.
In 1948, the statutes governing federal court jurisdiction were
revised.168 The federal question statute now provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”169 As
with the 1948 revision of the grant of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts have not read the 1948 revision of the federal question
statute as a change or expansion in its coverage. The 1948 revision
has been treated as if it were purely stylistic. In particular, the federal
question grant of jurisdiction has been interpreted since 1948 to encompass the well-pleaded complaint rule of 1908.170 Under this rule,
statutory federal question jurisdiction cannot be based on a plaintiff’s anticipation that the defendant may raise a federal statute in his
or her defense. Instead, a federal statute must be evident on the face
of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, which must directly allege
that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s federal rights under the
U.S. Constitution, treaties, or federal laws.171
B. The Domestic Relations Exception in Modern Day
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
the 1948 revision was purely stylistic and in no way substantive,172
and the survival of the well-pleaded complaint rule after the 1948
revision underscores this point. As Judge Richard Posner explained
167
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also Stein, supra note 178, at 688–90. However, the federal question statute is
read more narrowly and confers federal question jurisdiction only when a “suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” Am. Well Works Co. v.
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). State lawsuits that are likely to
lead to a federal law defense are not federal questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
even though they are federal questions for the purposes of Article III. See Mottley,
211 U.S. at 152–54.
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in 2006, the statutory limits on federal question and diversity jurisdiction survived the revision unscathed:
There is no good reason to strain to give a different
meaning to the identical language in the diversity and
federal-question statutes. The best contemporary reasons for keeping federal courts out of the business of
probating wills, resolving will contests, granting divorces and annulments, administering decedents’ estates, approving child adoptions, and the like . . . are
as persuasive when a suit is filed in federal court on
the basis of federal law as when it is based on state
law.173
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow that, “while rare instances arise in which
it is necessary to answer a substantial federal question that transcends or exists apart from the family law issue, in general it is appropriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic
relations to the state courts.”174 Thus, the Court in Newdow held:
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a
claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law
rights . . . . When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to
affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay
its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal
constitutional law.175
Many commentators, including Mary Anne Case, Cass Sunstein,
and Dale Carpenter, read the Newdow language as suggesting that
the U.S. Supreme Court did not want to decide a Fourteenth Amendment same-sex marriage claim at the time.176 Professor Harbach
writes:
173

Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006).
542 U.S. 1, 13 (2004) (citation omitted).
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A number of courts continue to apply the [domestic
relations] exception to federal questions, without reference to Newdow. . . .
Some courts have explicitly advocated extension of
the domestic relations exception to federal questions.
Other courts have limited the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. And still others have
noted that it is unsettled whether the exception applies to federal questions.
Perhaps surprisingly, Newdow itself has had considerable traction in the lower federal courts. A number
of courts have relied on Newdow to apply the exception to federal questions.177
The problem thus arises: were Obergefell, Windsor and Perry’s
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage
bans and DOMA “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,” as that language was used in the 1875 Jurisdiction and Removal Act? After much deliberation, we believe yes, they were.
Though the federal courts did not originally have the statutory
federal question jurisdiction to hear cases challenging the definition
of marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, or probate, family law
issues were sometimes raised in contexts where they were dispositive of a case at common law or in equity. In Reynolds v. United
States,178 George Reynolds, a leader of the Mormon Church, was
criminally prosecuted by the United States for the crime of bigamy,
which he committed in the Utah territory.179 Bigamy violates federal
law adopted under Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution, which
gives Congress the power to pass all needful rules and regulations
for the governance of federal territories.180 The U.S. Supreme Court

Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 (2005); and Jill Elaine Hasday,
The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004).
177
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correctly asserted federal jurisdiction over this case because the lawsuit involved a federal crime committed in a federal territory under
a federal law, which arguably violated the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause of the First Amendment.181 The federal anti-bigamy law, section 5352 of the Revised Statutes, provided as follows:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who
marries another, whether married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States
have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500,
and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five
years.182
As we discussed earlier, criminal cases have always been considered cases in law and equity with federal question jurisdiction, so
Reynolds’s criminal prosecution clearly arose under federal law.
However, it is also true that the case against Reynolds rested on a
federal definition of marriage. Though the case itself did not seek a
redefinition of marriage to accommodate bigamy, Reynolds did pursue a constitutional free-exercise-of-religion exemption from the
law against bigamy.183 As demonstrated by Reynolds, when the
United States brings a criminal case against a defendant whose defense rests on a federal constitutional right, the case qualifies as one
in law or equity as those words were understood in 1787.
Criminal cases involving the family were no more covered by
the domestic relations exception than were tort cases involving the
family. The U.S. Supreme Court expressly held in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards184 that a tort suit brought by a divorced wife alleging the
sexual abuse of her children by her former husband and his girlfriend
could go forward in federal court, notwithstanding the domestic relations exception.185 Following the reasoning of Ankenbrandt, the
federal courts had jurisdiction not only to review the constitutionality of Reynolds’s criminal prosecution, but also to judicially review
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the prosecution of the Lovings in Loving v. Virginia.186 In Loving, a
white man married an African-American woman in violation of Virginia’s criminal statute that forbade interracial marriage and miscegenation.187 The Lovings pled guilty to the criminal charge and were
sentenced to one year in prison, but the sentence was suspended for
twenty-five years so long as they left the State of Virginia, which
they did.188 The couple eventually challenged the constitutionality
of their criminal prosecution before the U.S. Supreme Court, and
like in Reynolds, the Court ruled that it had federal jurisdiction to
decide the case, noting that the suit was not purely matrimonial, but
rather one of a criminal nature.189
In contrast, the litigation in Hollingsworth was brought by two
same-sex couples who purely sought the right to marry and to marital status under the civil law without respect to any religious teachings as to who can marry whom.190 While the Governor and Attorney General of California agreed with the same-sex litigants that
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, California did allow for domestic partnerships, which provided same-sex couples all the tangible
benefits of a heterosexual marriage.191 The legal injury suffered by
the plaintiffs in Hollingsworth was, thus, not economic; instead, it
was rooted in their legal status as a couple being recognized by the
State of California as “a civil union” and not as “a marriage.” This
is today a legal cognizable injury for which one can bring a federal
lawsuit, but that was not always the case as a matter of legal history.
The Court of King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the
Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Chancery would not have had
jurisdiction in 1787 to hear a case that only challenged the legal definition of marriage, lacking a criminal or civil penalty component.
Perry’s case was a pure family law case, which did not arise under
the “common law or in equity” as these terms were understood in
1787 or 1875. The only English courts that would have had jurisdiction to hear Hollingsworth would have been the Ecclesiastical
Courts, which continued to hear all English family law cases until
186
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the middle of the nineteenth century. Therefore, although Perry’s
family-law case arises under federal law, specifically the Fourteenth
Amendment, we do not believe the lawsuit met the criteria of “equity” as per the original understanding of the federal question statute.
The litigation in Windsor differed from that of Hollingsworth in
that Edith Windsor’s claims involved a tort or civil penalty. We find
that the federal district court did have jurisdiction over Edith Windsor’s lawsuit against the United States challenging DOMA, insofar
as it subjected her to a $363,053 cost that she would not have owed
had she married a man instead of a woman. A suit for money damages against the government, where there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity, is clearly a “suit of a civil nature at common law
or in equity” and thereby presents a federal question for the purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The English courts of law and equity did frequently hear suits for money damages in 1787, and thus there is
nothing untoward in the district court’s decision to hear Windsor’s
case as an initial matter, even though the government lacked standing to subsequently appeal the case.
C. Why the Court Should Expand “Equity” to Include Same-Sex
Marriage Cases
Nonetheless, we should be careful about considering the original
understanding of equity jurisdiction with such inflexibility as in the
above analysis, for it is indisputable that equity jurisdiction first
arose in England to correct injustices occurring from an overly stringent and technical application of the law. As the seventeenth-century jurist John Selden famously said:
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure,
know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger
or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should
make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a
chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would
this be? One chancellor has a long foot, another a
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short foot, a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the same
thing in the chancellor’s conscience.192
Equity jurisdiction is, by its nature, malleable and inherently
protean, and it exists to correct rank injustices that might occur as a
result of a technical and rigid application of the law. One can no
more confine equity to its causes of action in 1787 than one could
confine the Necessary and Proper Clause193 to only those powers
that were “necessary and proper” for executing the enumerated powers in 1787. In 1787, it was not necessary and proper for the federal
government to have an air force, but it is in 2016.194 As the great
jurist Robert Bork wrote, “The world changes in which unchanging
values find their application.”195
The grant of equity jurisdiction by both the Federal Question Act
of 1875 and the Federal Question Clause in Article III allows for a
judicial power whereby the federal courts may, as a matter of conscience, intervene to correct an injustice at law in situations where
changes in the facts give an old principle a new application. Though
federal courts ought not take advantage of this power to expand their
equity jurisdiction capriciously, it is appropriate for the federal
courts to intervene when the nation is closely divided on a fundamental claim of constitutional right as to the legality of bans on
same-sex marriage. As Abraham Lincoln said:
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I believe this government cannot endure, permanently
half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to
be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but
I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become
all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of
slavery, will arrest the further spread of it, and place
it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it
is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike
192
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lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as
well as South.196
The same principle applies to same-sex marriage and, for that
matter, the legal recognition of polygamous marriage. Over 100
years ago, Congress recognized that the Union could not tolerate the
addition of even one polygamous state. Hence, Utah was forced to
ban polygamy as a condition for admission to statehood.197 Similarly, there are inevitable injustices that surface from the sanctioning
of same-sex marriage in some states but not in others, and these
wrongs should bother the conscience of the Court.
It is to correct injustices that we gave the federal courts equitable
jurisdiction, and the courts were right to use that jurisdiction to decide on the merits regarding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, even though equity would not have gone so far in 1787
or in 1875.198 Our confidence in this conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has exercised federal jurisdiction in two very important family law cases within the last twentyfive years: Michael H. v. Gerald D.199 and Troxel v. Granville.200
While both lawsuits were pure family law cases—the former involving visitation rights by adulterous fathers, and the latter involving
visitation rights by grandparents—none of the Justices or litigants
doubted the question of federal jurisdiction over the suits. The U.S.
Supreme Court heard and resolved both cases without any Justice
suggesting an absence of federal jurisdiction, and there was no adverse response from Congress with respect to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over either case.201 The Court’s decision in Obergefell further confirms our position: the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is archaic, inequitable, and
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ought to be overruled.202 Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will
agree when it hears its next same-sex marriage case.
There remains one final wrinkle in our argument not yet addressed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the U.S. Supreme Court has federal question jurisdiction to review final judgments rendered by the
highest court of a state when a decision could be had in which the
validity of a state statute is called into question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.203 This provision descends from Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, referred to above, and raises the question of whether a
state Supreme Court ruling on whether a state marriage statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment in a non-criminal case where no
financial consequences were at stake could be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court as a case in law or equity arising under the Constitution. The answer is yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court ought to
recognize a new equitable cause of action allowing domestic relations cases to be heard in federal court.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we believe that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear appeals in Windsor and Hollingsworth for appellants’ failure to
establish proper standing, and that pure same-sex marriage cases are
indeed cases in equity for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. We
agree with the Court’s conclusion in Windsor that DOMA was unconstitutional, and we applaud the ruling in Obergefell—there is a
right to same-sex marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment, enforceable in federal court. We therefore agree with the Obergefell
decision.
It is the nature of equity jurisdiction to evolve over time in order
to correct rigidities in the common law, and in a constitutional democracy like ours, new equitable causes of action may sometimes
be created by Congress, and other times, by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The word “equity” in Article III has a historical gloss that allows for
its extension over domestic relations cases. That exception reflects
archaic, gender-discriminatory laws like coverture laws and laws
202
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that did not allow women to sue for spousal rape. In light of the
nation’s core commitment in the Nineteenth Amendment to the idea
that sex discrimination as to political rights is unconstitutional, we
think that the Fourteenth Amendment ought to have been read from
1920 onward as rendering gender-discriminatory civil rights laws
unconstitutional.204 Since the domestic relations exception to federal
jurisdiction is inconsistent with the post-1920 promise of gender
equality in the Fourteenth Amendment, we think both Congress and
the Supreme Court could and should abolish the domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction in all remaining respects.
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